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Abstract: This paper develops and defends a new way for pacifists to deal with the prob-
lem of supreme emergency. In it I argue that a supreme emergency in which some disas-
ter can only be prevented by modern war is a morally tragic situation. This means that a 
leader faced with a supreme emergency acts unjustifiably in both allowing something 
terrible to occur, as well as in waging war to prevent it. I also argue that we may have 
cause to excuse from wrongdoing the agents who must choose an unjustified action in a 
supreme emergency. 
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Introduction 
 
Anti-war pacifism, broadly speaking, rejects war as an acceptable means 
for obtaining peace. It is a commitment to peace and opposition to war. 
The sort of anti-war pacifist argument I have in mind is non-absolute; it 
holds that modern war1 very commonly, or perhaps even inevitably, in-
volves harm to innocent persons on a scale that is too great to be justi-
fied. It posits that if the means necessary to waging modern war cannot 
be justified, then modern war cannot be justified. It holds the antecedent 
to be true (based on large-scale harm to innocents), the deduction to be 
valid, and thus the consequent to be similarly true.2 
 The most compelling and common objection to an anti-war pacifist 
stance is that while war is most certainly harmful, and should be avoided 
where possible, it can nevertheless be justified when it is the only means 
of preventing some much greater harm. This is the argument from pre-
vention: as bad as war is, it may sometimes be justifiably fought to pre-
vent some even worse disaster from occurring, such as that which threat-
                                                             
 1Modern war refers to war fought from the late nineteenth century into (at least) the 
near future. Particular features of modern war include types of weapons used, typical size 
of conflicts, locations of conflict, an increased presence of irregular forces, high rates of 
civilian death, and so on. 
 2See Robert L. Holmes, On War and Morality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1989). 
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ens a political community in a supreme emergency. This challenge basi-
cally rests on the claim that large-scale killing of innocents is not all-
things-considered wrong, but is, rather, merely prima facie wrong. If so, 
the moral presumption against killing the innocent may be compromised 
or overridden by other moral imperatives, such as the duty to prevent 
innocents from being killed. 
 The aim of this paper is to propose and defend what might be termed 
the moral tragedy solution to the argument from prevention. It frames 
supreme emergencies as morally tragic situations, in which there is no 
justifiable path to take. While waging war to prevent some great disaster 
cannot be justified, neither can failing to prevent that great disaster; the 
first part of the paper is aimed at establishing this position. Moreover, if 
there is no justifiable course of action to take, then agents who must de-
cide on a course of action nonetheless—the leaders of political communi-
ties—might be excused from blame for doing so; the second part of the 
paper is dedicated to this idea. The third part of the paper examines some 
of the implications of the preceding discussion. 
 Put simply, modern war causes great harm to innocents. The term 
innocent here means “not unjustly harming,” or “not unjustly threatening 
to harm.”3 A rights-based approach to innocence treats it as a right not to 
be harmed; generally speaking, someone who harms another acts unjustly 
since she violates that right. One who is not unjustly harming another 
maintains one’s innocence as well as one’s right not to be harmed. The 
innocent are those who are not intentionally or foreseeably threatening 
another with harm or death; it is at least prima facie wrong to kill them.4 
 Who is innocent in war? Most noncombatants are clearly innocent in 
the relevant sense, since they do not threaten harm to other innocents. 
Just combatants may be morally innocent since they are not engaged in 
any unjust harming, but rather in self- and other-defense.5 Approximately 
87 million people were killed by war in the twentieth century alone (not 
including those killed by genocide and famine): 33 million soldiers and 
54 million civilians.6 The majority of the latter, and perhaps many of the 
                                                             
 3See Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1990), and Suzanne Uniacke, Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence Justifi-
cation of Homicide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). From here on, the 
term “harm” also refers to “threatening to harm.” 
 4See Thomson, The Realm of Rights, Uniacke, Permissible Killing, and David Rodin, 
War and Self-Defense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002). 
 5See Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), and C.A.J. 
Coady, Morality and Political Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
pp. 111-12. Combatants are distinguished from noncombatants by distinguishing those 
who are involved in the chain of agency that prosecutes a war from those who are not. 
Most civilians are noncombatants, and most soldiers are combatants. 
 6Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First 
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former, were innocent of any wrongdoing that would compromise their 
right not to be killed. And the situation has worsened, not improved: 
from the beginning to the end of the twentieth century, the ratio of mili-
tary to civilian casualties in war went from 8:1 to 1:8.7 
 
 
Supreme Emergency 
 
Just war theorists maintain that the evils of war can sometimes be justi-
fied if war can be fought to prevent some greater evil; hence the moral 
presumption against killing innocents may on occasion be justifiably 
outweighed by the duty to prevent innocents from being killed.8 
 Supreme emergencies in which the killing of many innocents can 
only be prevented by killing many innocents present the strongest chal-
lenge to the claim that war cannot be justified. Note that while the su-
preme emergency problem faced by the just war theorist focuses on 
whether some great evil may be permissibly prevented by breaking the 
rules of war, such as the prohibition on intentionally killing innocents, 
for the pacifist the extreme measure is modern war itself. 
 To be a supreme emergency, as Michael Walzer suggests, a threat 
must be imminent, extreme, and “of an unusual and horrifying kind.”9 
Not just that, it must threaten the goods that are essential for the func-
tioning and well-being of the community, in such a way that challenges 
the very heart of the moral precepts that make pacifists condemn war or 
just war theorists prescribe the jus in bello. Proof of a real and imminent 
threat of large-scale massacre and enslavement would constitute a su-
preme emergency. Supreme emergencies are therefore not just rare, but 
exceptionally rare, and constitute a horrific outcome should the threat-
ened harm actually occur. It must also be preventable only by actions 
that fall outside the normal realms of moral acceptability—for the just 
war tradition, that means breaking the moral rules of war; for the pacifist, 
that means war itself. 
 Walzer’s solution to the supreme emergency problem is that we may 
sometimes do wrong to do right, so to speak; we must sometimes get our 
hands dirty in the name of good to prevent some great evil that it is rea-
sonable to think could not be prevented otherwise.10 It is not my task to 
                                                                                                                                        
Century (New York: Scribner, 1993), pp. 8-10 (does not include deaths after 1993). 
 7Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2001), p. 8. Coady has the ratio going from 9:1 to 1:9 (Morality and Politi-
cal Violence, p. 121). 
 8I leave aside other considerations such as the doctrine of double effect. 
 9Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 252, 253. 
 10See ibid., pp. 251-68. 
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discuss Walzer’s solution here, except to note that it has encountered 
both support and rejection in the just war tradition. Some of those who 
reject it hold it to be paradoxical, given Walzer’s commitment to jus in 
bello principles and the separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Oth-
ers argue simply that the most important facets of the jus in bello, such as 
the principle of discrimination (between combatant and noncombatant), 
ought not be violated, no matter what. 
 Other possible theoretical answers to the supreme emergency problem 
include: maintaining a significant moral distinction between killing and 
letting die, thus precluding the possibility of justified war;11 employing 
consequentialist reasoning to argue that war may be justifiably waged 
when doing so is the only means of preventing some greater evil; or in-
voking threshold deontology to maintain that while moral norms take 
precedence up to a point, beyond that point is the moral realm of conse-
quences, meaning that war may be justifiably waged when doing so is 
the only means of preventing some greater evil.12 The dirty hands, con-
sequentialist, and threshold deontological approaches are all incompati-
ble with anti-war pacifism. Maintaining a significant moral distinction 
between killing and letting die is compatible with anti-war pacifism, but 
attempts to maintain such a distinction do not succeed.13 I wish, then, to 
propose another approach to supreme emergencies, which treats them as 
tragic moral dilemmas, or moral tragedies. This approach, I believe, is 
compatible with an anti-war pacifist stance. 
 
 
Moral Tragedy 
 
A moral tragedy is a type of moral dilemma, which arises when the moral 
weight of rights or norms cannot be commensurated with the moral force 
of consequences or other competing moral considerations, a probably 
inevitable upshot of ascribing at least some value to most moral systems. 
In such situations there may be no “right” decision to make.14 We may 
feel that the benefits arising from a certain action will outweigh its costs, 
but still think that we ought not perform that action; we may be required 
to perform (or not perform) each of two acts, but are unable to perform 
                                                             
 11See Holmes, On War and Morality, and Jeffrie G. Murphy, “The Killing of the 
Innocent,” The Monist 57 (1973): 527-50. Attempts to establish such a distinction have 
proved unconvincing: see James Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” The New 
England Journal of Medicine 292 (1975): 78-80. 
 12See Michael S. Moore, “Torture and the Balance of Evils,” Israel Law Review 23 
(1989): 280-344. 
 13Nicholas Parkin, “Pacifism and Supreme Emergencies,” unpublished ms. 
 14Some, of course, refuse to accept the existence of moral dilemmas; here I assume 
their plausibility. 
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(or not perform) both. When there is no right decision to make, and the 
available options are tragic, a moral dilemma becomes a moral tragedy. 
 Bernard Williams argues that if an agent ought to perform two ac-
tions, but cannot perform both, it does not necessarily follow from one 
action being more morally weighty than another that an agent is therefore 
justified in performing that action; she ought, rather, to do two things.15 
In tragic cases, an agent might rightly think that whatever she does will 
be wrong, since neither conflicting moral claim outweighs the other (this 
is not the same as saying that the actions are equally bad, but rather that 
neither is good enough to be the right thing to do).16 
 Now one might respond to the moral tragedy picture by asserting that 
there is always a preferable option. But this alone does not show that the 
preferable option is justified. That one option consists of a “less bad” 
action, or produces less bad consequences, than another is not sufficient 
to justify it. Note, moreover, that this approach does not differ from our 
standard approach to morality. The moral status of a particular action 
often does not change depending on the moral status of other actions. 
 Analogously, any particular legal system distinguishes between legal 
and illegal actions. Say one must choose between two illegal actions. If 
one of those actions consists of a worse crime than the other, it does not 
follow that one may now legally perform the other. The same often 
seems true of morality, at least regarding sets of particularly bad acts. So 
even if we perform a terrible action because it is preferable to another, it 
does not follow that we are justified in doing so, since “we still choose 
an evil, and in this sense we do something wrong.”17 In this sense, if all 
the options involve serious wrongdoing, as Martha Nussbaum argues, 
“there is no ‘right answer’.”18 The fact that I am taller than my sister does 
not in itself show that I am tall; similarly, the fact that one terrible course 
of action is preferable to another does not justify it. 
 
 
Supreme Emergencies as Moral Tragedies 
 
In what way, then, is a supreme emergency a moral tragedy? To begin 
with, it is difficult to conceive of anything more morally tragic than a 
                                                             
 15 Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 73-74. 
 16See Thomas Nagel, “War and Massacre,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 (1972): 
123-44. 
 17Christopher W. Gowans, Innocence Lost: An Examination of Inescapable Moral 
Wrongdoing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 88. 
 18Martha C. Nussbaum, “The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis,” The Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2000): 1005-36, p. 1007. 
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situation in which many innocents will be killed no matter what happens. 
The supreme emergency can be viewed as a moral dilemma because it 
forces a leader to choose between competing alternatives—one moti-
vated by norms, the other by consequences—that do not outweigh one 
another. It can be viewed as a moral tragedy since all alternatives are 
undeniably tragic. On the one hand, the disaster threatened by the su-
preme emergency must be prevented since it would be so very bad were 
it to occur. On the other, the supreme emergency must not be prevented 
because of the extremity of what must be done to prevent it. Both views, 
it seems, can be rationally defended. 
 The moral tragedy approach does a good job of describing the di-
lemma faced by a leader in a supreme emergency. According to this ap-
proach, the supreme emergency means there is no way the leader can 
elect to do what is morally right; she can only choose from morally un-
justified options. In this sense, then, the leader has no choice but to do 
what is morally wrong. 
 Uwe Steinhoff, however, argues that “one always has a choice. In-
stead of killing [to prevent a disaster], one can also let the enormous dis-
aster happen.”19 The salient point here, however, is not that the leader 
cannot choose between waging and not waging war (it is clear that she 
can), but rather that she cannot make a good choice, a justifiable choice, 
since the situation forces her to choose a highly unacceptable action. She 
must act under extremely high levels of coercion; she is unable to choose 
a justified action. It is in this sense that she has no choice. 
 In certain situations, there may only be two options—to submit or to 
fight. And if submission to some intolerable evil is morally unthinkable, 
people can then intelligibly say that they have no feasible choice but to 
fight. But this cuts both ways, for one can legitimately and coherently 
say that if what must be done to fight is morally unthinkable, then one 
has no feasible choice but not to fight.20 Both claims—that we have no 
feasible choice but to avoid the evils of war, and that we have no feasible 
choice but to wage war to avoid the evils that will occur if we do not—
are morally compelling. Hence the supreme emergency that can only be 
avoided by large-scale warfare is morally tragic. 
 Brian Orend also states that “supreme emergencies …[are] cases of 
moral tragedy. A moral tragedy occurs when, all things considered, every 
viable option one is confronted with involves a serious moral viola-
                                                             
 19Uwe Steinhoff, On the Ethics of War and Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), p. 144. 
 20 Richard Norman, Ethics, Killing and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), pp. 221-22. 
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tion.”21 The fact that morally tragic situations invariably involve serious 
moral violations means that no matter what one does in a moral tragedy, 
one cannot justifiably do it: “It is a moral blind alley: there is no way to 
turn and still be morally justified.”22 This approach captures not only the 
difficult dilemma presented by a supreme emergency, but also the “full-
blown tragedy” of the situation. It incorporates the idea that killing many 
innocents is impermissible even if doing so saves many others, for “if 
you do wrong, you do wrong, even under the pressure of supreme emer-
gency.”23 
 One might be tempted to think that the moral tragedy simply arises 
due to different subjective moral claims, where one action appears better 
to one person and worse to another. In fact, however, the moral dilemma 
surfaces due to a clash between competing moral imperatives with com-
peting objective strengths. An agent’s decision in a moral dilemma will 
most likely be, in a sense, a personal one, but it is in another sense an 
objective one in that it invites endorsement or rejection from others as a 
judgment of the relative importance of particular features of our lives. 
The claim that war cannot be justified due to the predictable large-scale 
killing of innocents is an objectively strong one, but so too is the argu-
ment that sometimes a threat might be so overwhelming and evil that war 
must be fought to prevent it, as Norman eloquently suggests:  
 
To go to war is a terrible thing, and that assertion is not just an expression of subjective 
feeling but a judgement rooted in our understanding of our shared human life. There ap-
pear to be situations where war is the only available means of resisting an intolerable evil, 
and that too is an objective judgement, not a mere expression of feeling.24 
 
 These competing considerations are characterized by the weight they 
place on different moral concerns. For some, the maxim “do not kill the 
innocent,” especially in such large numbers, motivates the position against 
war. For others, consequences matter most, if the killing of a number of 
innocents in war could prevent the deaths of a much larger number of 
innocents if the supreme emergency is allowed to occur. But that is not to 
say that either position neglects the reasoning of the other—the moral 
tragedy arises precisely because each position is objectively compelling. 
                                                             
 21Brian Orend, “Just and Lawful Conduct in War: Reflections on Michael Walzer,” Law 
and Philosophy 20 (2001): 1-30, p. 28. Orend focuses on the intentional killing of inno-
cents, thus addressing possible violations of the just war theory’s jus in bello mentioned 
above. The point is essentially the same: the choice is between two severe moral violations. 
 22Brian Orend, “Is There a Supreme Emergency Exemption?” in Mark Evans (ed.), 
Just War Theory: A Reappraisal (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), chap. 7, 
p. 148. 
 23Ibid., p. 149. 
 24Norman, Ethics, Killing and War, pp. 222-23. 
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 Walzer has argued that the threat of Nazi Germany to Britain in the 
early 1940s constituted a supreme emergency.25 In 1940, Germany had 
defeated large parts of Western and Central Europe, had plans to invade 
Britain, and had already started bombing British cities. Neither the USA 
nor the USSR had yet entered the war. Winston Churchill first used the 
term “supreme emergency” to describe this situation, which lasted at 
least until late 1941, or possibly until sometime in 1943, by which time 
the USA and the USSR were fighting against Germany and the war had 
swung in the Allies’ favor. 
 Now Churchill’s argument that the situation meant Britain had a right, 
even a duty, to put aside the rules of jus in bello and purposefully attack 
innocent German civilians in order to ward off the threat is incorrect, 
because of the extreme violation of those civilians’ rights not to be 
harmed. But nor could he simply stand by and allow Nazi Germany to 
invade Britain, and perhaps even more of Europe, with all that that would 
entail. And so Churchill faced a moral dilemma over that period of time, 
and could do no right no matter what path of action he decided to take. 
 
 
Excusing the Agents of War 
 
I have so far argued that if a supreme emergency that can only be avoided 
by war is indeed a moral tragedy, then the act of waging war to prevent 
that supreme emergency cannot be justified. An agent who chooses to so 
act, therefore, acts unjustifiably. But an agent also acts unjustifiably if 
she fails to prevent the disaster; whatever the agent does, she does wrong. 
How, then, to judge leaders’ actions as responsible agents in supreme 
emergencies? How may a pacifist come to terms with the decisions made 
by leaders in supreme emergencies? In what follows, I argue that they may 
be excused from blame for what they do, since they must do wrong and 
thus have no choice but to do wrong. There has been some discussion re-
garding excusing deluded or coerced combatants from wrongdoing, but 
very little regarding the possibility of excusing leaders who do wrong by 
waging or not waging war in the first place.26 The pacifist position can be 
strengthened by maintaining the unjustifiability of modern war, even 
when fought to prevent some disaster, while recognizing that on occasion 
it may also be wrong to fail to wage war to prevent some disaster, as well 
as recognizing the difficulties faced by those who must choose between 
two or more morally unjustifiable options in a supreme emergency. 
 
                                                             
 25Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, chap. 16. 
 26For a brief discussion, see Orend, “Is There a Supreme Emergency Exemption?” 
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Justifications and Excuses 
 
An examination of the distinction between the concepts of justification 
and excuse will lay a foundation to separate the moral assessment of 
agents from the actions of those agents in morally tragic cases. Justifica-
tions apply to the morality of actions; excuses apply to the responsibility 
of agents for their actions. A justification involves a morally justified 
action caused by a moral agent (the action is held to be good, and re-
sponsibility is accepted), while an excuse involves a morally unjustified 
action caused by an agent who is, morally speaking, either partly or 
wholly not responsible for that action (the action is admitted to be wrong, 
but responsibility is denied).27 Simply, we may (or should) perform justi-
fied actions, and avoid those from which we must seek to be excused 
from blame.28 Consequently, this distinction has both moral and practical 
implications. Excused agents have done something wrong; agents who 
act justifiably have not. When someone is spared negative judgment or 
punishment, it makes a moral difference whether it is because she was 
entitled to do what she did, or because even though she acted badly she 
had an excuse for doing so.29 
 This difference has arisen in cases in which an abusive spouse or 
partner has been killed. The standard legal defense for such an act is 
temporary insanity or diminished responsibility. But even though a de-
fendant may be excused, and thus escape punishment, this defense im-
plies that her actions were wrong. Conversely, some have on occasion 
been successfully defended as having acted in justified self-defense.30 
One who is excused from blame for wrongfully killing her partner is 
viewed differently—by others as well as herself—from one who is found 
to have justifiably acted in self-defense. It appears to matter both morally 
and practically whether an agent is excused from responsibility for a 
wrongful act or found to have acted justifiably in the first place. 
 This difference continues into the international arena—justifying war 
fought to prevent some disaster is distinct from morally prohibiting war 
fought to prevent some disaster while perhaps excusing responsible 
agents from blame for their wrongdoing. The former approach admits 
that war can be justifiably waged to prevent a disaster; the latter does not. 
Similarly, the responsible agents are viewed differently—if war is justi-
                                                             
 27J.L. Austin, “A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address,” Proceedings of the Aris-
totelian Society, New Series 57 (1956): 1-30, p. 2. See also Kent Greenawalt, “Distinguish-
ing Justifications from Excuses,” Law and Contemporary Problems 49 (1986): 89-108. 
 28Greenawalt, “Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses,” p. 91. 
 29Andrew Botterell, “A Primer on the Distinction between Justification and Excuse,” 
Philosophy Compass 4 (2009): 172-96, p. 181. 
 30Ibid., p. 177. 
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fied, then they have done no wrong, but if it is not, then they have acted 
wrongly even if they are excused from blame for doing so. Even if the 
agent of war is excused from blame, however, the pacifist position re-
mains intact so long as the large-scale killing of innocents in modern war 
is unjustified. This position creates a much stronger presumption against 
the justification of war than one that even on rare occasions justifies war, 
just as there is a stronger presumption against killing abusive partners if 
the only defense available is diminished capacity as opposed to justified 
self-defense. Excusing the agent does not affect the moral status of the 
act; it is, rather, an acknowledgment of that agent’s particular position. 
 Let us now turn to the question of when agents may be excused from 
blame for their impermissible actions. An agent might be excused when 
her action is motivated by a reasonable yet mistaken belief—a leader 
might either be excused for waging war to prevent some disaster, or al-
lowing that disaster to occur by refusing to wage war, if she is non-
culpably mistaken about the nature of the emergency. An agent might 
also be excused when necessity, or lack of options, essentially forces her 
into performing some action—a leader might be excused when she can-
not choose a justifiable course of action, due to the fact that none of the 
possible actions is morally permissible. 
 
 
Agents Motivated by Reasonable Yet Mistaken Beliefs 
 
An agent might erroneously believe her action to be justified when it is 
not, based on a reasonable yet mistaken belief. Indeed, the action may be 
subjectively justified; a justified act need not always be objectively justi-
fied. But, in the strongest sense, a justified act is justified according to 
some objective standard. So a reasonable mistake can either be subjec-
tively justified or objectively excused, depending on the perspective of 
the evaluation.31 Hence we may distinguish between objectively justified 
and reasonably subjectively justified (yet objectively unjustified) actions. 
 The presence of a reasonable yet mistaken belief may exculpate an 
agent. Recall that we are considering complex situations in which there is 
no good course of action to take. As such, we can disagree with an 
agent’s beliefs or priorities, or with what she accepts as reasonable harm 
or risk. But if we accept that there are moral situations in which reason-
able people can disagree, and that the agent’s evaluation is honest and 
reasonable, then we might think that the agent is not responsible or not 
fully responsible for acting wrongly. So what does the justifying is not 
the belief, but rather the reasonableness of the belief, even if the facts 
                                                             
 31Uniacke, Permissible Killing, pp. 15-17. 
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differ from the belief. To act reasonably is not just to make sure that we 
try our best to be aware of relevant facts, but also that we properly bal-
ance our interests with those of others.32 Therefore we ought to try to be 
properly informed and to act fairly based on that information; the act 
should be necessary, proportionate, and so on. The belief must be rea-
sonable; so must the response to that belief. 
 It is at least plausible that agent-perspectival justification can serve as 
an excusing condition. But can reasonable yet mistaken beliefs be used to 
excuse leaders of states from wrongdoing for unjustifiably waging war? 
Leaders make mistakes—some seem reasonable, some do not. A leader 
might receive incorrect information that appears reliable, motivating her 
to act in some way. To be excused, a leader must be mistaken in thinking 
that her actions are justified, and she must have worked hard to deter-
mine whether her beliefs are the correct ones, as well as whether her ac-
tions are appropriate and justified responses to those beliefs. 
 Let us assume that in 2002 and 2003 the leaders of the United States 
believed that Iraq both possessed and had plans to manufacture weapons 
of mass destruction. As it turned out, much of this belief was based on 
bad information. Perhaps, then, their subsequent actions were motivated 
by subjective error. However, in order for their actions to be excused 
(assuming that they acted unjustifiably), the subsequent invasion of Iraq 
would have to be an appropriate response to that information (it would 
have to be proportionate, necessary, and so on), and they should have 
attempted to acquire more information so long as they had time to do so. 
These criteria were not satisfied, not least since the United Nations 
weapons inspectors had not finished their inspections, had requested more 
time to do so, and had advised that Iraq was cooperating with inspections 
and that the confirmation of disarmament through inspections could be 
achieved in a short period of time if Iraq remained cooperative. Hence 
the responsible leaders should not be excused from blame for their ac-
tions, since they did not act appropriately based on their mistaken beliefs. 
 If the actions required to prevent a supreme emergency involve kill-
ing many innocents, the leaders of a state should be quite sure, within 
reason, that they are doing the right thing. If it could be shown that their 
beliefs that led to many innocent deaths were reasonable, then they may 
be excused from blame for their actions. Leaders of states have far 
greater access to information than common individuals do. This, com-
bined with the fact that the defense of a state involves a much greater 
level of destruction than the defense of an individual, might mean that 
the leaders of a state should be much surer of what they know and what 
                                                             
 32Note that the latter is an objective matter—no excuse can rest on a flawed or overly 
subjective moral system. 
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the appropriate response is before they wage war than individuals should 
be before they engage in violent self- or other-defense. 
 On the other hand, the leaders of a state may face significant time 
pressure when having to decide whether to respond to an emergency, as 
well as the pressure of having to make a complex decision upon which 
the lives of many innocents may depend. A leader might make the wrong 
choice even if she has attempted to acquire as much information as pos-
sible. Predicting the consequences of each decision might also prove dif-
ficult. A leader’s mistaken belief could concern either the imminence or 
the scale of the threat—that, for example, a threat was a supreme emer-
gency when it was not. While leaders ought to know more than common 
individuals—not just because they have greater access to information, 
but also because the consequences of war are so much worse than indi-
vidual self-defense—the situations they face are much more complicated 
than those faced by common individuals. This increases the likelihood of 
justified mistaken belief. We may excuse leaders from wrongdoing that 
is motivated by genuine mistaken belief, but we should also hold them to 
high standards, especially since the consequences of their decisions can 
be grave. 
 
 
Agents Who Have No Choice But to Act 
 
The second (and more pertinent) way by which an agent may be excused 
arises when she cannot choose a justifiable course of action. In other 
words, morally speaking, she has no feasible choice but to do wrong. An 
agent faced with a morally tragic situation can choose between unjustifi-
able options, but she cannot choose to not choose, so to speak, nor can 
she choose to perform a justifiable action. It is in this sense that she has 
no choice. A leader in a supreme emergency, I have argued, has a choice 
to wage or not to wage war, but she does not have a choice whether or 
not to make that decision. She must choose, and if all available options are 
unjustified, then she has no choice but to choose an unjustified action. 
Hence one may argue that she ought not to be blamed for her unjustified 
action, since she cannot perform a justified one (note that if a moral trag-
edy is to be excused, the plight must not be of the agent’s own making). 
 As I have stated, in a moral tragedy there is no moral concern that can 
be justified by virtue of being less wrong than the other options avail-
able, since all of the options are so significantly and objectively wrong in 
themselves that they are unjustifiable. One action may seem worse than 
the other (it may result in a greater number of innocent deaths), but this 
does not in itself show that action to be justified, since both options are 
so very bad. I noted above that just as one can claim that one has no fea-
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sible choice but to fight, due to what will happen if one fails to do so, so 
too can one argue that one has no feasible choice but not to fight, due to 
the terrible nature of war. A leader may have no choice but to choose to 
kill many innocents or to let many innocents be killed, and if neither op-
tion is morally justified, then she is forced, by virtue of the role she fills 
as leader, to choose to act unjustifiably. 
 Note that if I must choose wrong no matter what I do, I should try to 
minimize the harm caused by my actions. Doing so does not necessarily 
mean that my choice is justified, since it may be that neither option is 
justifiable. Nevertheless, two options can both be unjustified and yet still 
not equal in terms of impact. But it remains the case that a possible ac-
tion can be so bad that it cannot be justified solely by virtue of being bet-
ter, or less harmful, in whatever sense, than another possible action. I 
would suggest that modern war has historically been so harmful that it is 
likely to be the worse option, especially given advances and successes in 
nonviolent conflict resolution and the like.33 The presumption should be 
against war, for all the good reasons established by the pacifist and just 
war traditions. 
 Even if a leader must choose between the killing of innocent citizens 
from her own country and the deaths of innocents from another country, 
it is not clear that she should prioritize her citizens. In favor of waging 
war it might be said that necessity dictates that she kill the innocents 
from the other community. But there are also strong moral reasons for 
her to avoid killing that group of innocents. Importantly, it does not fol-
low that she should let the innocents from her community die, but rather 
that she should not perform either action. Neither moral imperative ap-
pears to morally trump the other, unless, for example, we think that a 
leader has a very strong additional duty to protect her community, which 
binds her to save them. But even if she has such a duty, it is surely not an 
all-trumping duty; she also has a (very strong) duty not to kill innocents 
from other communities. The leader, then, is faced with a situation in 
which she can do no right. If she wages war, she kills many innocents. 
And if she does not wage war, she fails to do what she has been elected 
to do, to not only protect and provide for her own populous, but also to 
protect and provide for the international community. 
 It is generally accepted that “ought implies can”—an agent can only 
be reasonably expected to act in a certain way if it is possible for her to 
do so. There are two ways this might play out in terms of a moral trag-
edy. First, agent A may not be able to x. If A cannot x, then it makes little 
sense to say that A should x. If we cannot coherently say that A should x, 
                                                             
 33See, e.g., Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The 
Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
644 Nicholas Parkin 
 
 
then we cannot coherently say that A does something wrong by not x-
ing. Second, agent B may have to either y or z. Now it makes sense to 
say that B can choose between y-ing and z-ing. But if neither y nor z can 
be justified by virtue of being less wrong than the other, then it is true 
that B should not y, and that B should not z. And if B has no choice but 
to do either y or z, we can coherently say that B does something wrong 
by y-ing or z-ing, but not that B is bad for having done so, since B could 
not have done otherwise. It is for this reason that we might want to con-
demn the leader’s action, but (at least partially) absolve her from blame 
for performing that action. She could not have done otherwise, so we 
cannot coherently say that she should have done otherwise. 
 We might feel that although the leader may be excused from blame, 
she should also feel remorseful for performing one of the unjustifiable 
actions. This is because not only has she performed a highly unaccept-
able action, but also she became the leader because she wanted that job. 
It is no easy task to become the leader of a state; it requires both effort 
and conscious choice. But even though she has chosen her role, the fact 
that genuine moral tragedies are rare in the international arena, as well as 
the fact that once she had decided to take the position of leader she was 
forced into the particular situation, suggest that she might nevertheless be 
excused from blame for choosing either option in the supreme emer-
gency. Igor Primoratz notes that leaders can calmly weigh up the pros 
and cons of potential actions, and are not “filled with terror,” as perhaps 
an excused individual might be.34 This is true, but decisions must be 
made relatively quickly in a supreme emergency, with substantial pres-
sure, and the consequences of each action are so extremely bad that the 
moral tragedy remains, even if the decision-making process is slower and 
calmer than in an individual’s own supreme emergency. 
 This approach to the supreme emergency problem provides a good 
moral description of a leader’s predicament in a supreme emergency. Wal-
zer claims that the decision to kill innocents can be justified even though it 
is morally wrong; the paradox that ensues, however, causes theoretical and 
practical problems for his theory. The moral tragedy approach does not 
justify that which should not be justified. Moreover, it recognizes the 
tragic dilemma facing leaders in a supreme emergency, excusing them 
from blame if they had no choice. After all, someone must make these 
decisions, and it is not their fault that the alternatives are all so bad. This 
does not help us resolve which action is “less bad,” but that is the point— 
even if one is less bad than the other, neither is “good enough.” 
 
                                                             
 34Igor Primoratz, “Civilian Immunity, Supreme Emergency, and Moral Disaster,” The 
Journal of Ethics 15 (2011): 371-86. 
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Moral Tragedy and Anti-War Pacifism 
 
The above discussion has shown that excusing an agent from wrong-
doing is distinct from justifying her actions, not only because excuses 
affect the moral status of the agent while justifications affect the moral 
status of her actions, but also because an agent who acts wrongly yet is 
excused from blame is viewed very differently from one who does not 
act wrongly in the first place. I have defined moral tragedies as situations 
in which an agent must choose between highly unacceptable options. I 
have argued that a leader in a supreme emergency that can only be pre-
vented by war can neither justifiably wage war to prevent a disaster nor 
justifiably fail to prevent that disaster. 
 The anti-war pacifist position would, of course, be compromised if 
we were to concede that war could be justifiably fought to prevent some 
disaster. Such a concession separates those just war theorists who main-
tain a strong presumption against war from pacifists who argue that war 
is always unjustified. The moral tragedy solution does not justify war. 
One might argue, however, that this solution is not sufficiently “anti-
war” to be considered a pacifist one. Moreover, one might claim, paci-
fism should not allow the possibility of excusing from blame those lead-
ers who perform actions in a supreme emergency. 
 With regard to the agents of war, the first thing to remember is that to 
excuse the agent is not to excuse the war. One may argue that agents of 
war should not be excused; rather, they should be held accountable for 
their actions. And this is correct of most agents in most wars—leaders 
should only be excused in the most extreme of circumstances, when they 
have no justifiable options. Moreover, excuses do not provide agents with 
a reason to wage war. Just how a war is begun, and once begun how it is 
fought, should also affect how we judge the agents who cause that war. 
Respecting certain rules of war will not justify the war, but it at least 
shows the intention, and to some degree the morality, of the agents re-
sponsible. 
 Daniel Statman has argued that the moral tragedy position (as it ap-
plies to the just war problem) errs in failing to recognize that an action 
can be justified as the lesser evil even if it is intrinsically bad:  
 
The point of saying that such a situation represents a real dilemma is to emphasize that 
the intrinsic evil of the lesser evil option is not erased by the overall judgment that, in the 
circumstances, it should be preferred over the other (the greater evil) option. An action 
may be both justified and intrinsically bad.35  
                                                             
 35Daniel Statman, “Moral Tragedies, Supreme Emergencies and National-Defence,” 
Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (2006): 311-22, p. 314. Statman also argues (p. 313) 
that Orend, Rodin, and Norman agree that one may, on occasion, intentionally kill inno-
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In other words, that all the options are wrong does not mean that they are 
equally wrong, and hence the agent should choose the least bad option. 
 In responding to Statman’s argument we can also address the concern 
that the moral tragedy pacifist position is not sufficiently “anti-war.” His 
claim is that even if an agent is faced with a morally tragic situation and 
hence cannot choose a justifiable option, it does not follow that one op-
tion cannot be legitimately justified as the lesser evil. Bad actions can be 
justified, and this does not change when all the options are bad. One 
might go further, as Statman indeed does, to argue that the agent would 
act wrongly if she did not choose the lesser evil option. Since the agent 
has a choice between unjustifiable options, she ought to choose the least 
bad one, and for that she needs a justification, not an excuse: “The fact 
that all available options are morally wrong does not mean that they are 
equally wrong, and when they are not, then the agent is culpable for fail-
ing to choose the one that is less wrong.”36 
 Statman argues that leaders faced with a supreme emergency are not 
really forced to kill innocents, but rather must make a moral decision to 
do so. On the other hand, however, the point of the moral tragedy is that 
although it presents a choice, it is forced or constrained, to the extent that 
there is no real choice, since neither option is justifiable. If I do not have 
the option to perform a justified action, then how can it plausibly be said 
that I should perform a justified action? It cannot, since we cannot rea-
sonably expect persons to perform the impossible. If I can perform a jus-
tified action, then I ought to, but if I cannot, then it does not make sense 
to demand it of me. The “no choice” arises due to a lack of choices to do 
right. 
 The moral tragedy solution suggests that in certain cases, all options 
are tragic and unjustified, even when the consequences of one option are 
noticeably better than another. For example, imagine a case in which we 
can only prevent the killing of 1,000,000 innocents by killing 100,000 
innocents. Even if we hold that letting 1,000,000 innocents be killed is 
worse than killing 100,000 innocents, we might nevertheless hold that 
the situation is a moral tragedy in which there is no morally right course 
of action to take. The claim is that a good moral system cannot justify the 
killing of 100,000 innocents to save 1,000,000, since that would not pass 
whatever threshold is required to justify it. It may also be the case, of 
course, that failing to prevent the deaths of 1,000,000 innocents is also 
unjustifiable. The tragedy is not resolved just because one option is in 
                                                                                                                                        
cents. This claim is incorrect, although to elaborate would be beyond the scope of this 
paper (see: Orend, “Just and Lawful Conduct in War,” pp. 28-29; Rodin, War and Self-
Defense, p. 199; and Norman, Ethics, Killing and War, p. 230). 
 36Statman, “Moral Tragedies,” p. 314. 
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some sense preferable to another. Neither action can be justified if they 
are both highly unjustifiable, even if one has “less bad” consequences 
than the other. In such a scenario, an agent might be compelled to elect 
one action over another, but would not be justified in doing so. 
 Viewing the problem in this way suggests that an agent can some-
times be constrained to a morally relevant degree when faced with two or 
more choices, just as an agent is constrained to a morally relevant degree 
when she has no choice at all. The morally relevant feature of the tragic 
supreme emergency that can only be prevented by war is that the agent 
has no feasible choice but to choose the unjustifiable. She cannot choose 
an action that is even remotely justifiable; hence we cannot reasonably 
expect her to do so. And if we cannot expect her to do so, then it does not 
make sense to demand that she justify her actions in that situation. 
 Steinhoff argues that a certain action taken in a moral tragedy might 
be justified as the lesser evil. He claims that although the agent faced 
with a morally tragic situation cannot do something morally right—
“whatever one does, it is the wrong thing”—it is nevertheless the case 
that if one possible action is preferable to the other, then the agent ought 
to elect that action, and would be justified in doing so: “Since there will 
not be a modern war without the killing of innocents … no modern war 
can ever be just. This does not, however, preclude the possibility that a 
modern war can be justified—namely as the lesser evil.”37 This is be-
cause “the insight that a war, however noble its aims may be, is always 
an evil thing … is more appropriate to the tragedy that is war, and … can 
help to progressively restrict the dimensions of its evils.”38 
 But is it right to condemn war for severely violating the most impor-
tant rights of many people, but still allow room for its justification? The 
idea that two actions might be unjustified, and yet one is still morally 
preferable to the other, is applicable in many cases. Should, for example, 
a vandal break my letterbox or my front door? Probably the former, since 
although, all other things equal, both are morally wrong, the latter seems 
worse. But a supreme emergency is not this type of dilemma. Imagine I 
am forced into a situation in which something extremely bad will happen 
unless I do one of two things: kill person A, or kill persons B and C. 
Consequences are morally relevant, but it is not clear that I would be jus-
tified in killing A simply because her death results in one less death 
overall. It does not seem that preferring that one person die rather than 
two justifies the killing of that person. A supreme emergency presents an 
agent with an even worse set of choices. A leader might prefer one action 
to the other, but she does not have a good moral reason to do so. When 
                                                             
 37Steinhoff, On the Ethics of War and Terrorism, p. 57 (emphasis in original). 
 38Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
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two options are so unthinkably wrong, I do not believe it is right to say 
that one is justified simply by virtue of the fact that it is slightly less bad 
than the other. 
 The moral tragedy solution to the argument from prevention is a paci-
fist one in that it does not affect the pacifist’s deep commitment to peace 
and opposition to modern war. It reserves by far the larger part of the 
moral spectrum for anti-warism. It does not justify war in any way, al-
though it attempts to understand the difficult situations that sometimes 
motivate the recourse to war. Lying behind this stance, to use Albert 
Schweitzer’s wonderful term, is a “reverence for life.” This reverence for 
life may motivate actions to prevent great suffering, if completely neces-
sary, but that very same reverence means that those actions cannot be 
morally justified. 
 In short, since the morally tragic situation is one in which there are no 
justifiable options, viewing supreme emergencies as morally tragic does 
not adversely affect the pacifist claim that war is essentially unjustifiable; 
rather, in fact, it strengthens that claim. In this paper I have framed the 
supreme emergency problem as a serious issue for any anti-war pacifist, 
and in response have proposed the moral tragedy solution. Viewing su-
preme emergencies in which some disaster can only be prevented by war 
as morally tragic and thus absent of any even justifiable option maintains 
the pacifist position that war cannot be justified as the lesser evil. By also 
suggesting that failing to prevent the disaster may also be unjustified, 
however, this solution recognizes that refusing to wage war is not free 
from moral difficulty. And finally, allowing those well-intentioned lead-
ers trapped in a supreme emergency to be excused from blame for their 
actions treats them with the compassion and understanding that such a 
situation requires. Viewing supreme emergencies as morally tragic, I 
think, correlates with what we should feel about war in general—war is 
something to be avoided, at (almost) all costs, and yet we understand that 
sometimes, at least theoretically, war must be fought to prevent things 
that are much worse. A theory that can excuse those who choose to wage 
war or refuse to wage war under very special circumstances, but does not 
justify their doing so, reflects that sentiment.39 
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